Abstract-Voting is one of the important ways to solve the problem of collective decision-making. Previous work assumes that voters are only concerned about their own preference. However, in sequential voting, voters can see the results of voters who voted before them, such externalities naturally arise in sequential voting. This paper considers the externalities in sequential voting which use the traditional Borda counting rules. We establish a voting model to describe the voting strategies of sequential voting with externalities. In our prediction model, an agent will do a prediction in the case that he cannot bring change to the voting result no matter how he changes his preference order, under this circumstance, an agent will vote in accordance with his preference order. The voting model provides a theoretical reference for the actual situation of voting behavior.
INTRODUCTION
Voting is a very common phenomenon in our daily life. Voting rules and voting systems have been widespread concerned and become one of the focuses in collective decision-making. The study of formally defined voting systems is called social choice theory or voting theory, which is a subfield of political science, economics, or mathematics. Different voting systems use different types of voting rules. Common voting rules are Borda, Nanson, Baldwin methods and so on.
One of the common classifications of voting are sequential voting and simultaneous voting. In sequential voting, each voter observes the votes who vote before him. In simultaneous voting, each voter does not observe any others' votes before casting his votes. In the sequential voting, there may exist mutual influence among voters, which is called externalities in voting [1] .General speaking, externalities are cost or benefits that are not transmitted through price, and may be incurred by a party that was not involved in a transaction .For example, in fair division between multiple agents, each agent may derive value not only from its own piece [2] . Unlike in traditional voting without externalities, voters not only need to consider their own preference sequences, but also need to consider other people's voting sequences. Theories of externalities are widely studied in economics [3] [4] [5] , and recently have also been received attention widely in computer science literature, which includes coalitional games [6] , matchings [7] , fair divisions [8] .
In voting, a stream of recent papers study the externalities, of which Alon takes the external effects into account among voters [1] , he studied the sequential voting in the situation of two candidates, whose model aims to capture voting behavior ("likes") sequentialin social networks which are publicly observed and sequential [9] . Different from Alon, this paper establishes a voting model and a prediction model to analyze the process of sequential voting strategically. And our prediction model provides a theoretical reference to the actual situation of voting behavior.
II. BORDA RULE
Borda rule is a scoring system of the voting rules designed by Jean-Charles in 1770 [10] . Each voter has a 2nd International Conference on Software Engineering, Knowledge Engineering and Information Engineering (SEKEIE 2014) preference order of m candidates, the score which candidates got is determined by their positions in the preference order of voters. When all voters finish their voting, the candidate who gains the highest score is the winner. The Borda rule is widely used in politics, sports and non-governmental organizations around the world (e.g. Slovenia's parliamentary elections, American University American football and all kinds of competitions.). One of the features of Borda count is that it considers not only the first choice but also other choices and the preferences of voters. What's more, a different election vector will lead to a different election results.
III. VOTING MODEL AND PREDICTION MODEL
We introduce a general model for voting with externalities, which including a set S of m voters and a set a a a a f f f 
A. Voting Model
How voters behave in sequential voting with externalities? In this model, this paper assumes that voters do not know the preferences of other voters, and they cannot communicate with each other during the voting. Also we assume that voters are natural person, and they all hope that their first preferred candidate becomes the winner Consider the externalities for voter i and candidate p a .
When it is the voter's turn to vote, he will vote on the basis of the score of the prior voter 
The result of this voting will depend on the voting later, and now, voter i will make a prediction to the voting later, after which he will decide his voting sequence
In a word, i ( ) ( ) ( 1)
V a V a n ≤ − − is the point that voters will have a prediction to the voting later. Example 3: The known condition is as example 2. In accordance with the voting rules described in this paper, Voters will vote in sequence. For the first voter Pol, it is no doubt that he will vote as his preference:
a a a a f f f . After his voting, others can see the voting result score 1 ( ) q V a ( q = 1,2,3,4)( Table 2 ). (Table 3):   TABLE III.  THE EVALUATION a .
B. Prediction Model
As we can see from example 3, even though the first preference best a has been adjusted to the first position, and the current winner f a has been adjusted to the last position. 
We can see best a will not be the winner. Now what should voter i do is that taking the second preference as the first. Then, voters i will give up his first preference, and take the second preference into reconsideration as the first, and repeat above steps in accordance with the rules, and determine the voting sequence.
• 
IV. CONCLUSION
Our paper pays attention to the externalities in sequential voting, and takes the sequential voting with Borda rules as an example, analyzes the process of voting with strategies. One of the important contributions of this paper is establishing voting models and prediction models with concrete example. We draw a conclusion that the point of the voter to do a prediction is no matter how he adjust his voting sequence, his first preference cannot beat the current winner to become the winner of this round. All these studies provide a theoretical reference for the actual situation of voting behavior. Moreover, the future work in this field we plan to do is the voting strategy among intelligence agents.
